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Using a panel of the UK counties, spanning the period 2010-2016, this study explores 
whether having a Labour or Conservative council affects a county’s economic freedom. 
Due to data unavailability of any economic freedom index for the UK counties, 
the analysis employed direct measures in relevance to three sub-components of 
economic freedom, i.e. size of government, sound money and the freedom to trade 
internationally. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find strong evidence 
that the political ideology of a council affects all three sub-components of economic 
freedom. An implication of this result is that councils appeal to specific groups of 
voters when making policy.
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2 For an exhaustive look at works that use the EFW Index, see Hall et al. (2015).
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the political ideology of an administration authority (either on a national 
or regional level) affect the economic freedom enjoyed by this country or region? 
To answer this question, we must first define economic freedom. Gwartney et al. 
(1996) states that “individuals have economic freedom, when (a) property they acquire 
without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and 
(b) they are free to use, exchange, or give away their property as long as their actions do not 
violate the identical rights of others.” Based on this definition of economic freedom, 
Gwartney et al. (1996) develop the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index 
for 100 countries, spanning the period 1975–1995. Since then, the index has been 
extended by the Fraiser Institute to cover more countries and years. 
Given that the definition of economic freedom places a higher weight on 
limited government, a potential answer to the opening question of this paper is: 
yes, local administrators who favor smaller government should support policies 
that lead to a higher level of economic freedom. In the UK, politicians belonging 
to the Conservative Party (the Tories) are typically associated with a preference 
for a smaller government compared to those associated to the Labour Party. In 
the spirit of Downs (1957), the median voter theorem would suggest that ideology 
gives way to pragmatism and that administrators seeking to maximize the 
likelihood of election and re-election differ only slightly in policies and, as such, 
there should be insignificant differences in what is observed when comparing 
administrators from different parties, as it relates to the measure of economic 
freedom. Alternatively, county-level political competition might be viewed as a 
struggle between two different constituencies within the same region/county. In 
this environment, voters elect gubernatorial candidates who hold specific policy 
ideas that might impact economic freedom in different ways. A large body of 
research has examined whether the parties will converge towards the middle 
leading to very little difference if they are vote maximizers. A limited selection of 
this research includes Winters (1976), Garand (1988), Krehbiel (1993), Blais et al. 
(1993), Imbeau et al. (2001), Besley and Case (2003), Pettersoson-Lidbom (2003), 
and Lee et al. (2004). 
Researchers who have perhaps made the most use of economic freedom data 
are those studying economic growth. Compton et al. (2011) find that higher rates of 
economic growth are positively associated with economic freedom. Related work 
has focused on the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality 
with mixed results (Berggren, 1999; Scully, 2002; Carter, 2007; Compton et al., 
2014). In addition, research has been done on migration and economic freedom, 
the black/white income gap and economic freedom, and entrepreneurship and 
economic freedom2. More germane to our study, Bjornskov and Potrafke (2013) 
hypothesize that the ideology of economic freedom is favored by Republican 
voters. The authors examine whether policy in the areas of the size of government 
and labour market regulation is higher when Republicans are in control of the 
elected branches of a state’s government. They also find that Republican governors 
are more active in deregulating labour markets. In addition, Reed (2006) finds that 
Democratic control of the state legislature leads to higher tax burdens. However, 
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Reed finds that the political party of the governor has little effect on taxes. This 
latter result supports earlier findings by Besley and Case (1995). Thus, the influence 
of administrators’ political affiliation on economic freedom remains unsettled. 
One of the more well-known works by Caplan (2001) presents a model where 
the government becomes a ‘leviathan’ in that it grows faster and further than 
the desires of its citizenry. In this model, a government wants to expand its own 
power since this power then becomes self-reinforcing and leads to even greater 
power. One must keep in mind that if one political party is more conservative, 
there could be real limits placed on the growth of government when this party is 
in power, thus thwarting the ‘leviathan’ growth potential. Moreover, regarding 
this idea, Campbell et al. (2007) extend this model to include real growth rates of 
government with mixed results. The authors state that “as political parity increases, 
the capacity of the minority to block the majority increases thereby encouraging more 
interparty logrolling (ibid: p. 579).” These results seem to counter the results by 
Bjornskov and Potrafke (2013). 
Given the absence of data on the EFW index for the UK counties, the objective 
of this paper is to use data on the direct/specific components of the EFW index, 
such as government expenses, sound money and freedom to internationally trade, 
to test the idea that the political affiliation of the county councils in the UK has 
an appreciable impact on those sub-components. The overall economic freedom 
measure from this index is comprised of the following three sub-components 
for which data can be found across the UK counties. i) size of government, as 
government spending (a higher government expenditure is considered as 
impinging on economic freedom). ii) sound money is proxied by inflation, since 
inflation erodes the value of rightfully earned wages and savings, sound money 
is thus essential to protect property rights. When inflation is high, it becomes 
difficult for individuals to plan for the future and, thus, to use economic freedom 
effectively. iii) freedom to trade internationally, i.e. freedom to exchange is 
essential to economic freedom, which is reduced when freedom to exchange does 
not include businesses and individuals in other nations. 
In reality, there can be certain reasons why a county’s voters would elect a 
particular individual as member of the council and these reasons can also have 
an influence on the types of policy changes. Thus, the relationship between the 
party of the council and the abovementioned dimensions of economic freedom 
is potentially endogenous. Therefore, the hypothesis that the traits of economic 
freedom, mainly less government intervention in markets, would be more 
commonly associated with Conservative than Labour councils, is one that must 
be tested with a careful empirical approach. The analysis employs a regression 
discontinuity design that leverages the fact that the party of the council is a 
deterministic function of the vote margin between the Labour candidate and the 
Conservative candidate. This approach allows us to compare counties which are 
similarly situated except for their choice of the party of the council. To foreshadow 
our results, they provide supportive evidence that Labour councils lead to less 
economic freedom. In fact, we find strong evidence that a Labour council leads to 
a higher size of government. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the 
methodological approach and the dataset employed in this study, while Section 
III presents the empirical results and discussions. Finally, Section IV concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Methodology 
A starting point for several previous studies about the relationship between a 
council’s partisan ideology and economic freedom is a fixed-effects OLS model: 
where EFWit stands for county i’s component of economic freedom under 
examination in year t, Dit is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if county 𝑖’s council 
is from the Labour Party, and 0 if the council comes from the Conservative Party. 
The coefficient 𝛽 is a consistent estimator of 𝐷, if other potentially confounding 
variables, both time-varying and time-invariant, are accounted for in Equation 
(1). Time-varying confounders that might be related to both the component of 
economic freedom and the party of a county’s council might include the level 
of education in a county or the average income in that county. These and other 
observable variables are potentially accounted for in the vector 𝑿. Additionally, 
the term 𝛼 accounts for both observable and unobservable county fixed-effects, 
which could potentially influence the party of the county’s council, 𝛿 accounts for 
year-specific factors, which influence economic freedom that could be correlated 
with the party of a council, and finally ε denotes the error term. However, even 
after accounting for observable confounding variables, this fixed-effects model is 
still unable to account for time-varying unobservable factors that could influence 
a county’s level of economic freedom and the party of its council. For example, 
if an unobserved shock leads to a lower size of government and also increases 
the likelihood that a council from the Labour Party would be elected, then the 
estimated effect of a council from the Labour Party on this particular component 
of economic freedom would also be underestimated. Thus, we cannot rely on 
Equation (1) to provide a causal estimate of a council from the Labour Party’s 
influence on the particular sub-component of economic freedom. 
In order to overcome the endogeneity issue for unobservable shocks, we 
follow Lee et al. (2004) and Lee (2008) and employ a regression discontinuity 
approach. This approach relies on the fact that the party of the council in power is 
a deterministic function of the vote margin. That is:
(1)
where vit is the difference between the vote share of the first and second place 
candidates and vit>0, if Dit = 1 and vit < 0, if Dit = 0. We assume that unobservable 
variables that are not absorbed by the county fixed-effects vary with vote margin. 
In other words, once we condition on vote margin, 𝛽 can be estimated without 
bias, which can be expressed formally with: 
(2)
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where 𝑓(vit) is a flexible function of the vote margin. A final assumption that 
must be made is that (vit) is continuous. Requiring that the vote share function is 
continuous from both directions as it approaches the zero-vote margin position, 
allows us to approximate the level of economic freedom on either side of the 
Labour vote margin. We must make this approximation, because even the closest 
votes over our sample period have margins of hundreds of votes. We rely on both 
a linear and cubic control function in our estimation of Equation (3). 
The use of the regression discontinuity method thus allows us to compare 
the components of economic freedom of councils from the Labour Party who 
just barely won their election with councils from the Conservative Party who just 
barely won theirs. This is an important point, because the estimation of Equation 
(3) does not allow us to comment on the level of economic freedom in a county, 
where the council of either party won by a relatively large margin. Councils can 
win elections, because of past policies, because of past economic performance, or 
because of loyalty to the particular political party, amongst other reasons. These 
reasons can have implications for the types of policies the council will enact that 
contribute to a county’s level of economic freedom. Moreover, these reasons can 
affect not only who wins the race for council, but by how much (that is, the win 
margin). 
The validity of the regression discontinuity approach hinges on the 
requirement that once we control for vote margin and other observable time-
varying confounding variables, a county’s economic freedom score does not 
change as we cross the threshold from a Conservative council to a Labour council, 
except for the impact of the council’s ideology. In order to assess this validity, 
we follow a recommendation by Lee and Lemieux (2010) and regress each of the 
potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. If these variables 
are continuous across the 50%-50% cutoff, then the coefficient on Labour council 
should be close to zero.
B. Data
The starting point for this project is the UK county-level annual data, spanning 
the period 2010-2016 period. These years are chosen based on data availability 
and primarily on the fact that counties experienced significant reforms prior to 
2010. In particular, the UK local (county) governments are elected bodies that 
operate in territorially bounded geographical areas, employ professional career 
staff, and generally receive over two-thirds of their income from the UK central 
government. They are multi-purpose authorities delivering services in the areas 
of education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, public housing, 
leisure and culture, and welfare benefits. In the UK, prior to the consolidations 
that took place in 2009, there were 386 county governments of five types, 32 
London boroughs, 36 metropolitan boroughs, and 46 unitary authorities, mostly 
in urban areas, delivering all of the services listed above. In the rural areas, by 
comparison, there were 34 county councils administering education and social 
services, as well as 238 district councils providing welfare and regulatory services. 
(3)
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The data used in this study are drawn from two main sources: the Department for 
Communities and Local Government’s Revenue expenditure and socio-economic 
deprivation statistics, and the UK National Census Statistics and the annual mid-
term population estimates published by the Office of National Statistics.
As discussed above, our economic freedom measures are based on data from 
explicit data that describe three out of the five components of the EFW index. These 
three main components are considered as the dependent variable in our estimates. 
More specifically, the size of the government across counties is measured as the 
total net service expenditure per capita of each county, supplemented within 
analysis of the expenditure on the major local government services within county 
areas: education, social care, environmental services (e.g. waste management, 
environmental health), transport (e.g., highway maintenance, bus services), leisure 
and culture (e.g., libraries, sports centres, museums), administration (i.e., central 
support services), land use planning, and, social housing. Data are obtained 
from the Office of National Statistics. Next, we obtain from the Office of National 
Statistics data on relative county consumer price levels of goods and services in 
order to calculate the role of inflation as a part of the sound money component of 
economic freedom. Finally, data on imports and exports per county are obtained 
from the gov.uk site on Her Majesty’s (HM) Revenues & Customs in order to 
estimate the trade openness measure per county3
The primary political variable of interest is the political party of each county’s 
council. First of all, the post-2009 consolidation period includes 45 counties, of 
which 27 come from England, 4 from Northern Ireland, 9 from Scotland and 5 from 
Wales. In addition, in relevance to the English counties, 6 of them are characterized 
as metropolitan and the remaining as non-metropolitan areas. Data come from 
the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, published by the 
HM Government. Moreover, in terms of the political background of those councils 
and in relevance to the two major political parties in the UK, i.e. Conservatives 
(Tories) and Labour, out of 45 counties, in 36 the majority of seats come from the 
Conservative Party and in 9 counties from the Labour Party. These data come from 
legislation.gov.uk, as well as from the House of Commons Library. 
A number of variables measuring county-level characteristics that could 
be related to the party of the council are also used to assess the validity of the 
regression discontinuity design. County personal income per capita (which 
provides statistics on self-employment, employment, pension and investment 
income) is obtained from HM Revenues & Customs. County personal income 
is converted into constant 2010 pounds using the annual consumer price index, 
available from the Office of National Statistics. The percent of the population living 
in a census-designated metropolitan area is also retrieved from various editions 
of the Office of National Statistics. Finally, the percent of the population with a 
bachelor’s degree is extracted from the gov.uk. Summary statistics are provided 
in Table 1. 
3 Measured as the percent of the sum of imports and exports to GDP).
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The table provides summary statistics for seven variables. SD denotes standard deviation, minimum statistics (Min.) and maximum 
(Max.) statistics together with their mean are noted.
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Labour Council           0.126 0.501 0.000 0.219
Personal Income (2010 £, thousands)   29.56 6.48 15.29 44.78
Percent with Bachelor's Degree 0.157 0.046 0.068 0.317
Percent in Metro Area 0.257 0.191 0.168 0.273
Inflation (%) 1.27 0.16 1.15 1.38
Net Service Expenditure Per Capita 9,367.5 1.079 9,35 9,385
Trade Openness (as % of GDP) 0.65 1.02 0.54 0.78
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for seven variables. SD denotes standard 
deviation, minimum statistics (Min.) and maximum (Max.) statistics together with 
their mean are noted.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Baseline Results
Table 2 provides the results from Equation (3) using the entire sample of counties 
and a linear vote margin control function. Recall that an important assumption 
made in Section II was that observable and unobservable time-varying confounding 
variables vary continuously with the vote margin. Given this assumption, the 
inclusion of the control variables in the vector 𝑿
𝒊𝒕
 in Equation (3) is not necessary. 
However, as pointed out by Fredricksson et al. (2013), if these control variables are 
not endogenous to the council’s party affiliation, their inclusion can potentially 
make the estimate of the effect the council’s party more precise. 
The findings document that with respect to the component of the government 
size (net service expenditure per capita-Column 1) there is statistical (at 1%) 
evidence that a Labour council can implement policies that lead to higher size of 
government. Moreover, the size of the estimated coefficient indicates that a Labour 
council leads to a size of government that is higher by approximately 0.47, which 
economically is a substantial effect. In particular, the standard deviation of the size 
of government is 1.08, implying the average effect of a Labour council on this sub-
component of economic freedom is 43.4% of the standard deviation. With respect 
to the other two sub-components of economic freedom, the results indicate that 
a Labour council contributes 35.6% to higher inflation and 35.4% to weaker trade 
openness.
The control variables included in this regression specification also display 
statistically significant relationships across the three specifications of economic 
freedom. In particular, personal income per capita is positively correlated with all 
three sub-components of economic freedom, while the higher the percentage of 
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people with a college degree, the higher the government size and trade openness 
are, and the lower inflation is. Finally, there is an indirect association between 
the percentage of population living in metropolitan counties and the size of 
government, and a positive association between this part of the population and 
both inflation and trade openness. 
The table reports the linear estimates of a Labour council on economic freedom. Figures in brackets denote p-values. Finally, *: 









Labour Council 0.468*** 0.057*** -0.361***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Personal Income Per Capita(-1) 1.094*** 1.659*** 2.344***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Percent with College Degree(-1) 0.318** -0.094* 1.028***
[0.03] [0.06] [0.00]
Percent of Population in Metro Areas(-1) -0.084** 0.127** 0.562***
[0.05] [0.04] [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.68 0.82
No. Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128
The table reports the non-linear estimates of a Labour council on economic freedom. Figures in brackets denote p-values. Finally, 









Labour Council 0.496*** 0.069*** -0.388***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Personal Income Per Capita(-1) 1.138*** 1.594*** 2.137***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Percent with College Degree(-1) 0.279** -0.073* 0.874***
[0.04] [0.08] [0.00]
Percent of Population in Metro Areas(-1) -0.089** 0.146** 0.528***
[0.05] [0.03] [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.66 0.83
No. Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128
Table 2.
 The Effect of a Labour Council on Economic Freedom (Linear Version)
Table 3.
 The Effect of a Labour Council on Economic Freedom (Non-Linear-Cubic Version)
Table 3 repeats the previous analysis, but this time it employs a non-linear 
(cubic) vote margin control function. The new findings provide strong statistical 
support to those reported in Table 2.
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B. Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design 
Even though the evidence shows no causal impact of a council’s party on the 
economic freedom witnessed by a county, it is important to show that the regression 
discontinuity approach used in this paper is valid. This approach can only be used 
if the researcher is confident that time-varying county-level characteristics, which 
could potentially be correlated with the party of the council, are not systematically 
different under a Labour council that is barely elected compared to a Conservative 
council that is also barely elected. If any of these county-level characteristics are 
different on either side of the vote margin cut-off, then it would be imprudent to 
state that the council’s partisan affiliation is the cause of any differences between 
economic freedom. 
A common way to test the validity of the regression discontinuity design is 
to regress potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. This 
method, proposed by Lee and Lemiux (2010), examines whether these variables are 
discontinuous at the vote margin cut-off. It is important to note that this validity 
test can only examine whether the observable variables, are discontinuous at the 
vote margin cut-off. We have no way of testing whether unobservable county-level 
characteristics are discontinuous at the cut-off. Tables 4 and 5 (the linear and non-
linear versions, respectively) give us confidence that the other variables that are 
plausibly related to whether a county has a Labour council are similar as the vote 
margin moves from Labour to Conservative. 
The table presents the results of testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design in its linear version by regressing 












Democratic Council -0.00048 -0.00036 -0.00018
[0.28] [0.39] [0.55]
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.22 0.14
No. of Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128
The table presents the results of testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design in its non-linear version by regressing 












Democratic Council -0.00048 -0.00036 -0.00018
[0.28] [0.39] [0.55]
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.22 0.14
No. of Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128
Table 4.
 Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design (Linear Version)
Table 5.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design (Non-Linear Version)
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IV. CONCLUSION
The definition of economic freedom emphasized the importance of limited 
government with respect to the government size, sound money (inflation) and trade 
openness sub-components of economic freedom. Previous research for the case of 
the US had found evidence that Democratic governors enact higher income taxes 
and that Republican governors are associated with less labor market regulation. 
However, researchers had also found evidence that the party of the governor had 
little effect on important policy outcomes which contribute to economic freedom. 
Given this motivating definition and the unsettled nature of the previous 
research, we hypothesized that Labour councils in the UK would enact policies 
that would lead to lower economic freedom compared to Conservative councils. 
The analysis tested this hypothesis using county-level data in the UK, spanning 
the period 2000–2016 and employed a regression discontinuity approach in order 
to overcome potentially endogenous relationships between the party of the council 
and other factors that could affect the choice of council and the types of economic 
policies that are implemented. 
The results provided strong statistical (and economic) support to the 
hypothesis. Over the time period studied, we found strong evidence that a Labour 
council led to lower economic freedom compared to a Conservative council. The 
conclusion one could draw from these results is that the partisan ideology could 
affect economic freedom through certain sub-channels, such as government size, 
sound money and the freedom to internationally trade. In other words, partisan 
ideology can have substantial effects on a county’s voter.
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